 in the course of negotiations, part of the second peace process initiated by a call from Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), in October of last year. The initial indication of this was Bahçeli's statement itself, wherein he hinted at some sort of freedom for Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned founder of the PKK, if he were to speak at a pro-Kurdish opposition Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) group meeting in parliament and call on his militant group to renounce violence.){kind=link}
Ömer Murat*
There is sufficient evidence to conclude that the Turkish government has made certain commitments to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the course of negotiations, part of the second peace process initiated by a call from Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), in October of last year. The initial indication of this was Bahçeli’s statement itself, wherein he hinted at some sort of freedom for Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned founder of the PKK, if he were to speak at a pro-Kurdish opposition Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) group meeting in parliament and call on his militant group to renounce violence.
A written statement from the PKK on May 12 announcing its dissolution says that the continuation of the process is linked to Öcalan’s freedom as follows: “The implementation of these decisions requires that Leader APO [Öcalan] leads and directs the process, that the right to democratic politics is recognized and that there is a solid legal guarantee.”
The second promise made to the Kurdish side seems to be that Turkey will recognize to some extent the autonomous state in northeastern Syria, known to the Kurds as Rojava, formed by the Syrian Democratic Forces, of which the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) is the backbone. A striking statement confirming this came from Bahçeli following the PKK’s announcement of its dissolution. In his written statement, the MHP leader asserted that “the question of how and in what manner to ensure the control and supervision of any possible transitions or transfers from the dissolved PKK to the PYD/YPG, as well as the implementation of such measures in a manner consistent with the collective and public conscience, must be addressed.” The YPG is known to be an offshoot of the PKK.
As the PKK prepared for its complete dissolution, there was a lot of speculation about the future of the organization’s leaders and senior militants, especially about which Western countries they would go to. Bahçeli’s statement actually means that this will not happen, that these people will stay in the region, go to Rojava and join the YPG. This development also clarifies the intended meaning of the cryptic statement in the PKK’s dissolution announcement that “activities carried out under the name of the PKK have been terminated.”
However, a similar predicament emerged in the previous peace process which collapsed in 2015 and despite initial optimism, ultimately yielded outcomes that were antithetical to the desired results. A significant challenge persists in this regard: Despite Bahçeli’s explicit statements mentioned above, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has not publicly acknowledged these commitments to the PKK. Instead, he engages in a propaganda campaign that portrays the PKK as having capitulated to ongoing operations and as having accepted the “benevolent embrace” of the state.
It is important to recall that during the first peace process, negotiations with the PKK had reached such a stage that Erdoğan was making behind-the-scenes efforts in Western capitals to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. These were the developments that I witnessed as a Turkish diplomat at the time. Yet the Justice and Development Party (AKP) leader had deliberately avoided taking public ownership of the process, a strategy he continues to employ today, delegating negotiations to his close associates. And when push came to shove, he abandoned the process, citing a lack of knowledge of the proceedings. (He simply claimed he had no knowledge of it.) The reason behind this decision was that he had decided that stirring up the Kurdish conflict and inflating the terrorism threat posed by the PKK would be more advantageous for his electoral calculations as he moved towards a presidential regime.
We are currently witnessing a comparable process. The leader of the ruling AKP is acting as if Bahçeli’s above-mentioned statements had never been made, stating that he considers the PKK’s dissolution declaration to be “a decision that includes all the group’s branches in northern Iraq, Syria and Europe.”
Main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Özgür Özel criticized the situation, saying, “Didn’t Mr. Bahçeli admit that the issue of allowing some PKK members to go to Syria was under consideration? What we understand from what Mr. Bahçeli said is that those who conducted the negotiations on behalf of the state made certain commitments. Mr. Bahçeli keeps referring to this. Mr. Erdoğan, on the other hand, says to his own deputies: ‘There are no negotiations, there are no agreements; go and explain this to the people.’ Mr. Bahçeli’s statements undermine Mr. Erdoğan’s arguments. Mr. Erdoğan’s behavior also undermines Mr. Bahçeli’s words.”
Despite these apparent differences in the peace process, there is no other sign of discord between Erdoğan and Bahçeli. In fact, when Erdoğan said this week that “I have no intention of running again or being re-elected” — which was met with skepticism — Bahçeli responded with a lengthy written statement calling on the AKP leader to run again, presumably as Erdoğan had hoped, if not arranged in advance.
In fact, Erdoğan responded to Özel’s criticism by saying, “No one should be worried. We know very well what we are doing together with Mr. Bahçeli.” Thus, he indirectly supported Bahçeli’s statements about the second peace process. But note that he did this again indirectly. The effort of the AKP leader to steer the process from a distance, ready to step aside if necessary, is obvious.
Turkish Minister of Justice Yılmaz Tunç, when asked whether a legal arrangement would be made for Öcalan to be granted certain freedoms as part of the new peace process, said, “Such a scenario is not under consideration at the moment. There are no such talks.” It is obvious that this is a blatantly false statement. In fact, it caused considerable discontent in the Kurdish camp, prompting DEM Party spokeswoman Ayşegül Doğan to respond to Tunç by saying, “Your tone falls short of the constructive language needed for this process. Unfortunately, it creates a toxic atmosphere.”
There is no indication that the divergent approaches of Erdoğan and Bahçeli toward the peace process have been reconciled. Indeed, contradictory developments persist. In an additional statement issued on May 18, Bahçeli proposed the establishment of a 100-member commission composed of representatives from all political parties in parliament to “prepare the roadmap” for the second peace process. Erdoğan remained silent about the proposal, while the AKP acted as if it was unaware of the issue. Zafer Sarıkaya, the deputy chairman of the AKP, has said that the PKK’s declaration of dissolution is not enough for the establishment of such a commission. He has also said that this will only be possible if the PKK actually lays down its arms. It is implausible that such a statement rejecting Bahçeli’s proposal was made without Erdoğan’s knowledge.
From my point of view, the implications of all this are clear. We have an Erdoğan who is once again trying to hide the promises made in the negotiations with the Kurds from the Turkish public. As many polls have shown, Erdoğan, whose popularity has further decreased after the arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor of İstanbul, has not been able to convince the vast majority of the public about the new peace process. This is despite the fact that the basic parameters of the negotiations with PKK are kept secret from the public, the majority of which would not be supportive of concessions made to the PKK.
Erdoğan has made it abundantly clear that he intends to organize a constitutional referendum within two years at the latest, followed by a presidential election. Faced with the upcoming electoral cycle, he may once again choose to foment social polarization by inflating the threat of PKK terrorism. This calculated maneuver is designed to rally nationalist voters around his political persona and further intimidate the opposition. He employed a similar strategy after the collapse of the earlier peace process, and history may well repeat itself. From a rational point of view, the likelihood of this scenario appears significantly greater than that of the current process being completed as initially envisioned.
*Ömer Murat is a political analyst and a former Turkish diplomat who currently lives in Germany.