Thirty-eight percent of Turks have a negative opinion of NATO, according to a national survey published earlier this month that signals growing skepticism about the alliance in this key member state.
The Turkish General Social Survey (TGSS) found that 38.5 percent of Turks view NATO unfavorably, while 34.75 percent remain neutral and only 27 percent express positive opinions.
This reflects a broader trend of ambivalence toward the Western military alliance that Turkey joined in 1952.
The TGSS is a comprehensive national study that mirrors established international research programs such as the US’s General Social Survey (GSS) and the European Social Survey (ESS).
The project examines Turkey’s social, economic and political landscape while allowing comparisons with global patterns.
Turkey formally joined NATO on February 18, 1952, after its accession documents were ratified by then-president Celal Bayar.
Marking 73 years of membership in 2025, Turkey became one of the first two nations along with Greece to join the alliance after its founding by 12 original signatories in 1949. Turkey’s membership was seen as a strategic boost to NATO’s southern flank, providing the alliance with significant air, land and naval capabilities while strengthening its collective defense framework.
Turkey currently ranks among NATO’s top five contributors to operations and missions.
In 2024 the country met NATO’s defense spending benchmark, allocating 2.09 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense and joining 23 member states that achieved the 2 percent target.
Additionally, Turkey is the eighth-largest contributor to NATO’s military budget, accounting for 4.59 percent of common funds, and holds the seventh position in personnel contributions to alliance command structures.
However, relations between Ankara and NATO have grown increasingly turbulent, as highlighted by the survey showing nearly 40 percent public disapproval.
Tensions intensified under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s two-decade rule, marked by disputes over regional security priorities and democratic norms.
After supporting NATO missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo in the early 2000s, Turkey’s alignment with the alliance frayed during the Syrian civil war.
Ankara opposed US backing for Kurdish fighters it views as linked to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Turkey and its Western allies designate as a terrorist group. Relations further deteriorated in 2019 when Turkey acquired Russian S-400 missile systems, triggering US sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and its removal from the F-35 jet fighter program.
Turkey has played a dual role since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, brokering the Black Sea grain initiative while maintaining trade ties with Moscow.
It also invoked the 1936 Montreux Convention to block NATO warships from entering the Black Sea, a move that applied equally to both alliance and Russian vessels.
Turkey delayed ratification of Sweden’s NATO membership for two years, demanding action over exiled nationals sought by Turkish courts on terrorism accusations, viewed by many in the international community as political charges and an end to arms embargoes. A US pledge to sell F-16 jets in January 2024 resolved this impasse; however, critics warned of setting a transactional precedent for alliance decisions.
President Erdoğan’s overtures to the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and interest in BRICS membership underscore Turkey’s pursuit of non-Western partnerships. While Turkey has been a SCO dialogue partner since 2012, it has not formally applied to join BRICS.
Ankara’s deepening ties with Moscow and Beijing may challenge alliance unity amid escalating global instability.