Adem Yavuz Arslan*
From the presidential palace in Ankara to diplomatic corridors in Brussels, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has a new refrain: Turkey needs a new constitution. Not for his own benefit, he insists, but for the country’s democratic future.
Don’t believe it.
Erdoğan’s latest call for constitutional reform, floated last week upon his return from an official visit to Hungary, comes packaged in familiar rhetoric. “I have no desire to run again,” he told reporters. “This is not about me.”
But Erdoğan has made similar assurances before and broken them just as often.
In 2009 he said he wouldn’t run for parliament again. In 2012 he vowed it would be his last campaign for party leadership. In 2022 he labeled the 2023 presidential election his “final” race. And earlier this year, he called the 2024 local elections a “farewell.” Turkish voters have heard these parting words before and they know what follows.
In reality Erdoğan is preparing the legal groundwork for a potential fourth presidential run. Turkey’s constitution allows a president to serve only two terms. Erdoğan was first elected in 2014, re-elected in 2018 and by constitutional logic should not have been eligible in 2023. But a 2017 constitutional overhaul, implemented under emergency rule after a failed coup, was interpreted by loyalist courts as a “reset,” effectively restarting his term count.
There is one narrow legal loophole: A president may run a third time only if parliament calls early elections. Erdoğan would rather avoid that route and the political risks that come with it. A new constitution offers a simpler solution. By proposing what he calls a “civilian constitution,” Erdoğan can again reset the clock, offering himself a clean legal slate, no snap elections required.
Let’s be clear: This isn’t constitutional modernization. It’s a strategic maneuver to prolong personal power.
Erdoğan already wields near-absolute authority. Following the controversial coup attempt in July 2016, an event many critics say has never been fully investigated, he declared a sweeping state of emergency. Over the next two years, he reshaped Turkey’s institutions in his image: purging thousands of judges and prosecutors, shuttering media outlets, jailing opposition figures and replacing checks and balances with loyalty and fear.
Today, the judiciary functions less as a pillar of democracy and more as an extension of the presidency. Turkish courts routinely ignore the constitution, defy binding rulings from the European Court of Human Rights and prioritize Erdoğan’s political goals over legal consistency.
Ironically, Erdoğan’s current efforts come despite the fact that Turkey’s 1982 constitution, imposed by a military junta, has already been repeatedly revised. Key changes were made in 1987, 1995, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010 and most dramatically in 2017, when Erdoğan used the post-coup climate to implement a presidential system that dismantled parliamentary power and centralized authority in the executive.
These amendments weren’t about expanding rights or deepening democracy. They were political instruments designed to sideline opposition and entrench Erdoğan’s rule. When pro-Kurdish party leader Selahattin Demirtaş gained momentum in 2016, a constitutional amendment quickly lifted parliamentary immunity, allowing Erdoğan’s government to imprison him.
The 2017 transition to an executive presidency didn’t streamline governance, it eliminated oversight.
So why push for another overhaul now?
Because even for a strongman, legitimacy matters. Erdoğan no longer seeks merely to govern, he seeks to validate his continued rule with the veneer of legality and the symbolism of democratic renewal. A new constitution offers both.
In a country where constitutional guarantees are ignored, judicial independence has collapsed and international human rights rulings are flouted, Erdoğan’s pledge of a “freer, more democratic” charter rings hollow. No constitution, however progressive on paper, can protect liberties when those in power refuse to honor the rule of law.
Let’s call this what it is: not a national reform project, but a campaign strategy. Erdoğan’s talk of stepping aside is not a farewell, it’s a calculated feint.
The international community and Turkey’s own citizens would do well to see through the rhetoric. This isn’t about the constitution. It’s about the consolidation of power.
*Adem Yavuz Arslan is a journalist with over two decades of experience in political reporting, investigative journalism and international conflict coverage. His work has focused on Turkey’s political landscape, including detailed reporting on the 2016 coup attempt and its aftermath, as well as broader issues related to media freedom and human rights. He has reported from conflict zones such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, and has conducted in-depth research on high-profile cases, including the assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. Arslan is the author of four books and has received journalism awards for his investigative work. Currently living in exile in Washington, D.C., he continues his journalism through digital media platforms, including his YouTube channel, Turkish Minute, TR724 and X.