[OPINION] Despite his harsh rhetoric, Erdoğan’s Syria policy takes conciliatory line toward Israel

Ömer Murat*

An examination of the speeches delivered by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the president of Turkey, to the Turkish people could easily lead to the conclusion that the AKP leader is fundamentally pursuing an Islamist, ultranationalist ideological foreign policy.

However, an analysis of the Erdoğan government’s actions, as opposed to its speeches, may lead to the conclusion that it is pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy with the ultimate goal of maintaining positive relations with the West, particularly the United States.

Numerous examples of this phenomenon can be cited during Erdoğan’s more than two decades in power, but the focus here is on some recent developments in this regard.

During a speech at a mosque after Eid al-Fitr prayers on March 30, Erdoğan declared, “May God destroy Zionist Israel,” to which Professor Ali Erbaş, president of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, who was standing next to him, said “Amen.” Turkey and Israel have different visions for Syria in the new era that began after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, leading to considerable tension between the two countries. As a result, his speech, which bore a striking resemblance to the passionate rhetoric often used by Iranian politicians, could have led one to believe that the two nations were on the verge of a serious confrontation in Syria.

But that was not the case. Just 10 days after these comments, on April 9, Turkish and Israeli officials met in Baku for talks hosted by Azerbaijan to establish a deconfliction mechanism in Syria. An Israeli official stated that at this meeting, Israel “made it unequivocally clear that any change in the deployment of foreign forces in Syria, in particular the establishment of Turkish bases in the Palmyra [Tadmor] area, is a red line” and that “preventing any such activity is the responsibility of the government in Damascus. Any activity that endangers Israel will threaten the rule of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.”

In contrast, the Turkish side adopted a much more conciliatory and diplomatic stance in its statements on the Baku meeting. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan cited a desire to avoid potential discord with Israel over operations in Syria as the reason for the meeting. Meanwhile, the Turkish Ministry of Defense has stated that Turkish and Israeli officials met in Baku with the aim of establishing a deconfliction mechanism “to prevent unwanted incidents in Syria.” The ministry has also confirmed that efforts to establish this mechanism will continue. It is clear from this development that, despite his inflammatory public statements, Erdoğan is actively seeking to reduce tensions in relations with Israel.

A similar attitude can be seen in Erdoğan’s apparent shift in policy toward the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), US-allied Kurdish forces that control in northeastern Syria. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu government’s vision of a federal Syria after the dissolution of the Assad regime, with ethnic groups such as the Druze and Kurds having their own armed forces and governments, is based on the premise that this would serve Israel’s primary security interests. Despite the ambiguity surrounding the nature of the Trump administration’s policy in Syria, it is clear that the US has historically prioritized a solution that would legitimize the SDF, with which it has been allied for nearly a decade in the fight against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). It appears that the Trump administration, which is seeking to end (or at least reduce) the US military presence in Syria, is looking for a formula that will satisfy both Israel and the SDF.

Erdoğan, who asserts the indispensability of a unified Syria, maintains that the SDF, of which the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) are the core, must be completely disarmed and subordinated to Damascus on the grounds that the YPG is known to be an arm of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Until recently, the Erdoğan government categorically refused to use the term “SDF,” insisting instead on “YPG/PKK.” This was Ankara’s way of saying that it would not accept an autonomous administration under the control of the SDF in northeastern Syria. It insisted that other countries recognize the SDF as such.

This policy of the Erdoğan government has been a constant source of tension in its relations with the United States, even prompting Trump to send Erdoğan a letter during his first term warning him not to be “a fool.” In this threatening letter to Erdoğan, Trump demanded that the Turkish armed forces cease their recent military operation against the SDF, a demand to which Erdoğan reluctantly acquiesced.

Given the ongoing military alliance between the US and the SDF in their joint efforts against ISIL, and Israel’s expressed willingness to extend support to the SDF, it is foreseeable that this issue will continue to be a factor in the ongoing tensions between these nations and Turkey. Nevertheless, it is clear that Erdoğan is inclined to prevent this from happening and has initiated a series of concessions aimed at resolving the issue. The first indication of this was Ankara’s positive reaction to the agreement signed between al-Sharaa and SDF leader Mazloum Abdi in Damascus on March 10. This implicitly signaled that the Erdoğan regime no longer considered Abdi a “terrorist.

Another similar development was a statement by Defense Minister Yaşar Güler last month. For the first time Güler used the term SDF instead of YPG/PKK when talking about developments in Syria. It soon became clear that this was not an isolated incident when Erdoğan answered questions from journalists on his plane after his visit to Italy last week. Erdoğan takes journalists known to be pro-government with him on such foreign visits. On the flight back from the Italy visit, these selected journalists ask Erdoğan carefully prepared questions. The content of the texts, which are also published on the website of the Directorate of Communication (dubbed the ‘Propaganda Ministry’ by the opposition), shows that there is usually no spontaneous dialogue and that the questions are answered in writing.

According to the text published after the recent official visit to Rome, a Turkish journalist used the term SDF instead of YPG/PKK in his question to Erdoğan, who himself refrained from using the term YPG/PKK in his reply. For those familiar with the Erdoğan regime’s control over the media and the meticulous preparation of such texts, including questions, it was not difficult to notice an important change here.

Erdoğan, who had a poor relationship with former US president Joe Biden, perceives Trump’s re-election as a significant opportunity. He seems determined not to let the situation in Syria jeopardize his relationship with Trump this time. This is also closely related to the fact that he is losing popularity as the economic crisis in the country deepens. He is currently facing significant domestic challenges after his main rival, the mayor of İstanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu, was arrested on highly questionable corruption charges on March 23. Erdoğan believes that closer ties with Trump will help him overcome these challenges. The fact that he controls 90 percent of the media in Turkey gives him a sense of security. He believes that the Turkish people will not sufficiently question the difference between his fiery rhetoric aimed at the public and his pragmatic approach to foreign policy, which allows him to easily set aside his lofty ideological principles.

Nevertheless, despite exercising significant control over the media, Erdoğan has been unable to halt the decline in his popularity. Consequently, there are inherent limits to the extent to which he can articulate a particular stance in the domestic context while maintaining an inconsistent position on the international stage. This tension means that no matter how pragmatic Erdoğan tries to be in foreign policy, he may not always be able to avoid being held hostage by his own fiery public rhetoric. The example of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who surprised many political commentators and politicians by launching an invasion of Ukraine, shows that even pragmatism is no guarantee that an authoritarian leader with declining popularity will not make unexpected, erratic foreign policy decisions.

*Ömer Murat is a political analyst and a former Turkish diplomat who currently lives in Germany.